Throughout the holy month of Ramadan, the Islamic State (IS) and its worldwide followers were especially deadly. The recent attacks in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, Malaysia, Turkey and Yemen signal shifts in IS’ strategy toward an accelerated global campaign following the group’s loss of Fallujah last month and the ongoing battle over Sirte.

IS’ campaign to wreak havoc in Saudi Arabia likely reached a new level July 4. IS is suspected of carrying out three separate suicide attacks across the kingdom within 24 hours, including one next to the al-Masjid an-Nabawi (the Prophet’s Mosque) in Medina following the earlier attacks in Qatif and Jeddah. In total, the explosions killed four (excluding the suicide bombers) — a relatively low death toll compared with the 200 dead from IS’ July 3 blast in Baghdad. Nonetheless, the coordinated strikes demonstrated IS’ ability to outsmart Riyadh’s vigilant security apparatus despite the 2,500 alleged IS members arrested in the kingdom since 2014.

Of course, IS has had its eyes set on Saudi Arabia since an early point in the group’s rise to power. In November 2014, IS’ leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared war on the kingdom in a statement released by al-Furqan Media Foundation. The IS leader called for expanding the “caliphate” to Saudi Arabia to topple the Al Saud rulers (whom he called “the serpent’s head”) of the “lands of al-Haramain” (two holy places). For nearly two years, IS has been waging terror across Saudi Arabia via networks of local militants operating a network of terror cells. From November 2014 to June 2016, the group’s affiliates have carried out 26 terrorist attacks in the kingdom, according to the Saudi Interior Ministry.

Yet the July 4 attacks represent unique and especially grave threats to the kingdom for several important reasons. First, the ruling family’s religious legitimacy is based on the Saudi rulers’ service as a responsible and competent “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” (every Saudi monarch’s official title since 1986). There is a widely held perception throughout the Muslim world that since the historic Grand Mosque seizure of 1979, the scores of fires, stampedes, demonstrations and one bombing (1989) have proven that the Al Sauds are unfit to uphold their responsibility. The July 4 suicide blast outside the al-Masjid an-Nabawi in Medina is deeply unsettling for Muslims worldwide who travel by the millions to the holy site each year, and it is damaging to the kingdom’s prestige. Unquestionably, the explosion in Medina, an offense to Sunni and Shiite Muslims, will add to this narrative told by many of Al Saud’s enemies.