The United States and Iran had little trust in one another when it came to negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Yet, Iran provided some comfort when it implemented steps necessary to ease sanctions. Four months after Implementation Day for the JCPOA, Tehran is struggling to show tangible and substantive economic benefits.

Iran’s leadership, and increasingly the political elite and middle class who supported the nuclear negotiations, is accusing the United States of undercutting the JCPOA by not taking adequate steps to allow for Iran’s re-entry into the global economy. Unless such perceptions (or misperceptions) are addressed, the base of support in Iran for the JCPOA and additional engagement with the West is likely to shrink. 

The nuclear deal was based on a quid pro quo in which all sides would obtain real benefits. In January, Iran finalized substantive modifications to its nuclear program while enhancing the ability of world powers to monitor and verify its future nuclear activities. In return, Iran was provided sanctions relief as a means of reconnecting to financial and commercial networks, particularly in Europe. Easing sanctions was not, however, an end in itself. Rather, Iran’s side of the bargain was to be provided the opportunity to inject new life into its economy.

Sanctions have been eased, but Iran’s ability to realize post-sanctions opportunities has been impeded and over-promised. Undoubtedly, Iran’s domestic policies and self-induced political risk are hampering commercial appetites for investing in the country. There is a growing perception across Iranian society, however, that the US position has been calculated to preserve Iran’s economic isolation in response to outstanding regional security concerns and the longstanding enmity between Tehran and Washington.