Russia's Syria dilemma
Moscow wants a political settlement to the Syrian war, but its military support, which is resulting in regime victories on the battlefield, could threaten that outcome.
Could the Syrian army’s recent military successes against rebel forces, and its possible conquest of Aleppo, be too much of a good thing for Moscow? After the suspension of the Geneva III talks, this is an important question for Russian leaders to consider.
Conventional wisdom holds that Russia’s goal in Syria is to force the United States, regional powers and Syrians into choosing between President Bashar al-Assad’s Damascus regime and the violent extremism of the Islamic State and other groups. According to this view, Russia’s airstrikes work toward this goal by weakening nonextremist forces and gradually transforming the conflict from a three-way civil war into a two-sided, anti-terrorism operation. If this happens, ongoing US airstrikes against IS would more demonstrably benefit the Assad regime.
The capture of Aleppo would surely represent a major victory for the Syrian regime and significantly strengthen its control over the most densely populated parts of the country, particularly in the wake of parallel victories in southern Syria, one being the recent capture of Sheikh Mishkin. Indeed, while the fighting around Aleppo is more complex than suggested in most Western media accounts, many fear that Aleppo’s fall could devastate the Syrian rebel forces. Despite this, a regime victory that appears to produce a lasting shift in momentum could have unintended consequences that expose differences between Moscow and Damascus and further complicate Russia’s involvement in the Syrian war.
The central issue is that Russian and Syrian interests and objectives are not identical. In short, Moscow is much more interested in a negotiated outcome and, therefore, less interested than Damascus in trying to achieve a battlefield victory. As a result, Russia’s aim is to change rebel groups’ cost-benefit analysis to encourage them to participate in talks on something closer to the Assad regime’s terms. Yet the more successful the war, and the weaker the rebels become, the less pressure Assad will feel to negotiate. Why deal if victory appears within reach?
