As negotiators close in on a possible nuclear agreement with Iran, David Albright, one of the most widely quoted Washington experts on the issue, says that a formula that allows Iran to operate 6,000 rudimentary centrifuges but keep a stockpile of only 500 kilograms (2,205 pounds) of low-enriched uranium (LEU) would provide assurance that Iran could not produce fuel for a nuclear weapon for a year without detection.

Albright, one of a handful of so-called gatekeepers who frequently testifies about Iran on Capitol Hill, told Al-Monitor on Feb. 23 that he has other concerns about the negotiations, particularly how they will address allegations of past Iranian nuclear research with military dimensions. But when it comes to the breakout period — a key metric that estimates the time it would take for Iran to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear bomb if it chose to do so — there seems to be declining daylight between Albright’s position and that of the Barack Obama administration and the rest of the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1).

Interviewed by Al-Monitor a year ago, Albright said Iran could meet the breakout goal with several combinations such as 4,000 IR-1 centrifuges and less than 100 kilograms (220.5 pounds) of uranium enriched to 20% of the isotope U-235. Iran has about 19,000 centrifuges installed in two facilities, of which about 9,000 are currently operating.

Under an interim nuclear agreement reached in November 2013 and extended twice, Iran stopped producing 20% uranium gas and converted its stockpile to powder or fuel rods. Iran has continued to enrich uranium to 5% or less, and currently has about 8,000 kilograms (17,637 pounds) in a gaseous form that is easy to further enrich, according to a Feb. 19 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran has reportedly agreed to send out large quantities of LEU, probably to Russia, under a comprehensive accord.