Russia’s desperate economic situation looks increasingly likely to limit its influence in the Middle East in the short to medium term — partly due to practical economic constraints, but also in the intangible world of perception. Nevertheless, Moscow’s most significant tool in the region does not depend on its economy and will remain largely undiminished in its effectiveness.

Moscow’s fundamental economic problem is bad policy. After years of exhortation, neither President Vladimir Putin nor Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has succeeded in diversifying Russia’s economy to reduce its vulnerability to volatile energy prices, or in combating the corruption that drains away much of the wealth Russia earns from energy exports and stifles small and medium businesses, or in promoting innovation to drive the advanced economy that Russia could have built. Their best move so far has been to amass considerable financial reserves that have saved Russia twice — in 2008-2009 and today. But even the roughly $400 billion that Russia still has won’t last forever.

Saudi Arabia’s continued willingness to endure the ongoing collapse in oil prices has inflicted a double blow on Russia’s economy, whether intentionally or not. First, of course, low prices have sharply reduced revenues for both Russia’s federal budget (which relies on oil-related taxes and duties for about 50% of its income and needs prices to average at or above $100 per barrel in 2015 to avoid deficits) and its energy companies. (Note also that Russia’s natural gas contracts typically link gas prices to oil prices with a time lag.) Second, because currency and stock traders know how much Russia depends on energy prices, plunging revenues have savaged the ruble — which has fallen from 32 to 64 to the dollar over the last 12 months. While not the principal cause of Russia’s economic problems, US and Western sanctions have compounded them by constraining Russia’s access to foreign financing at precisely the time when such access matters most.

In this environment, Russia’s economic influence in the Middle East is bound to suffer. The Kremlin is already slashing nondefense government spending. Russia’s leading state-owned energy companies — Gazprom and Rosneft — are under heavy pressure, too — though Gazprom’s ruble-denominated capital investment budget increased by about 4.5% from 2014 to 2015, its dollar value has plunged. According to Russia’s news agency Interfax, Gazprom is considering significant staffing cuts — up to 25%, or as many as 125,000 jobs.