Fear, in its various forms, has always been at the root of the most tragic events in the history of humankind. Nowadays, fear of the onset of the bloody Islamic State (IS) and the spread of Ebola are having a tremendous impact on the behavior of global and regional players. It is fear that seemingly binds together these two otherwise unconnected threats. According to Jonathan Freedland, "[IS] feeds Ebola, and Ebola feeds [IS] — and our fear feeds them both."

The fight against IS has combined into one its military, oil, economic and financial components. It has already become a familiar argument that airstrikes alone cannot defeat these fanatic hangmen. And as they are suffering heavy losses, if they mix among the local population, most of the casualties of the airstrikes will be civilians, which will serve to dramatically increase the number of supporters of the jihadists. Perhaps with this in mind, the US command has kept the number of sorties on Iraqi and Syrian territory fairly low. According to media reports, over the weekend of Oct. 18-19 there were only a couple of dozen sorties, whereas during the campaign against Serbia in 1999 there were 138 daily. During Operation Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991 there were an average of 1,100 strikes every single day.

At the same time, no one is rushing to engage in direct combat on the ground with an enemy dreaded for its boundless fanaticism and equally boundless brutality. That is, apart from the Iraqi army (which is subjected to derogatory, and perhaps not entirely deserved, criticism), the Kurdish militias and the highly professional, disciplined Syrian government forces, which are forced to fight on several fronts all at once. In a recent confidential conversation, one American colleague told me, "It is clear that, under favorable circumstances, only the Syrian armed forces will be able to defeat the jihadists." However, as they engage in bloody battles with the jihadists — not only from IS, but also with the al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra and other rebel groups — they suffer heavy losses.

It is a known fact that the Turkish leadership does not want to fight with or even help the Syrian Kurds under siege in Kobani (Ayn al-Arab). It is also well-known that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan argues that his decision rests on the fact that the Democratic Union Party (PYD) leading the fight against IS is an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been declared a terrorist organization not only by Ankara, but also by Washington. His stubborn position has seriously strained relations with the Kurdish minority in Turkey and, in case the situation further deteriorates, it may reduce virtually to zero any progress made in recent years by Ankara’s "Kurdish policy." Among the nearly 52% of voters who cast their ballots for Erdogan in the last presidential election, there were also Kurdish ones who today would possibly vote differently. In Moscow, the US decision to airdrop arms, ammunition and military equipment to Kurdish fighters in Kobani is seen as a sort of U-turn in their relationship with a key ally in the region, namely NATO-member Turkey. Russian analysts have also noted that some of their American counterparts have dubbed Turkey a "non-ally state."