After seven weeks of confrontations in the Gaza Strip, a cease-fire has been reached. The details are still sketchy, and needless to say, it is still too early to judge if this truce will last. However, regardless of the durability of the new deal and its implications for Israel, it's safe to say that a new reality may unfold in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority (PA) could return to the Gaza Strip, at least to run the Rafah border with Egypt. While this seems a benign move, it is not; it could open the door to a new scenario that was previously considered far-fetched — an indirect Egyptian involvement in the governance of Gaza.

First, it's important to note that Egypt does not want to control Gaza. It only wants to contain its own problems and shield the Sinai Peninsula and the Rafah border from infiltration by radical militants from Gaza. Recently, Egypt has stepped up its operations to destroy most of the tunnels that Hamas and other groups have built underneath the Rafah border. Inevitably, however, tunnel destruction has aggravated an already shaky relationship between Egypt and Hamas, especially after the ousting of Islamist President Mohammed Morsi by the Egyptian army.

Furthermore, the war has highlighted how Egypt cannot protect its border and act as a neutral mediator in the Gaza crisis at the same time. Hamas has bitterly complained that Egypt is not a fair mediator. In addition, some Israelis have quietly wondered whether the Egyptian army’s aggressive tunnel destruction triggered the crisis. The confrontation in Gaza has become an awkward three-party affair, with each party expecting and demanding different things. In the end, by forging the cease-fire deal, Egypt seems to have managed to get what it wants. It forced Hamas to accept the return of the PA to run the Rafah border crossing, and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi seems to think that the return of the PA will solve Egypt’s problems with Gaza. The question remains, however, can Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas deliver what Egypt wants (security of its border) without heavy support from the Egyptian authorities? Unlikely.

Abbas’ success in Gaza will depend on the goodwill of both Hamas and other Palestinian factions. This goodwill cannot be guaranteed in the future. It would be naive to assume that Hamas and Abbas will be happy partners for any length of time; Egypt would have to step in to support a weak Abbas and sustain his new existence. The nature of the Egyptian involvement will be determined depending on the future survival of the truce. However, this involvement can easily become palpable and deep, at least in the security and intelligence aspects. Gradually, Egypt can be forced to either act openly as Abbas’ patron or leave him to sink in the Gaza’s post-war political swaps.