“Although the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant — ISIS or the Islamic State (IS), as it calls itself today — is not considered in Turkey an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, they are all part of the same network and none should be identified as Sunni,” said Professor Hilmi Demir of the Hitit University Religious Studies department, in a conversation with Al-Monitor. Demir, also a scientific adviser to the 21st Century Turkey Institute, an Ankara-based think tank, said these terror groups also pose a serious threat to the Sunni population in the region, in addition to the Shiites and minorities. To him, these groups should be defined as “Salafist-jihadists” and the Sunni label was misused in this context, only to specify non-Shiite.

With that, Demir challenged Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s assertion that the IS militants and the Syrian regime have been in a partnership. Explaining that the IS was initially formed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who in October 2004 swore loyalty to the late al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, Demir suggested that either Davutoglu reached his conclusion through the converging interests that emerged momentarily between the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the IS militants without analyzing their core differences, or he simply exaggerated Assad’s ability to control these groups.

“The US forces killed the group’s first leader, Zarqawi, in June 2006. He was replaced by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, who was also killed by US forces in April 2010. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi then became the new leader. Born in 1971 in Samarra, Baghdadi is an academic with a doctoral degree,” said Demir. “Unlike the al-Qaeda terror, the IS militants fighting in Syria did not aim to take on Assad’s forces, but to capture swaths of land and dominate them, because they want to establish the Islamic State.” He added, “Some misinterpreted their tactics and claimed they refrained from fighting against the Assad forces. Their tactics were, however, clear. They did not prioritize toppling the Assad regime, but chose to capture territory and consolidate their control there. Therefore, they first selected places where there was no to little Assad presence. Saudi Arabia and Qatar mainly preferred this, as [the militants] would create a buffer zone between Syria and Iran while forcing Assad to a low profile. There is no other way to explain the numerous Free Syrian Army members joining the IS ranks.”

Demir recalled that what was then ISIS broke away from any sort of allegiance with al-Qaeda in February 2014 — the time frame when Davutoglu said, “This crime structure called ISIS is an entity directly working with the [Assad] regime.” Demir stressed that as ISIS (also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) became more independent, all signs pointed to this group being here to stay for the long term. He also argued that Turkey’s approach in considering ISIS distinct from al-Qaeda also helped it to establish a presence in the region for the long term. “With that, Turkey also opened the door to negotiations with this group, as [Ankara] did not consider it directly linked to al-Qaeda.” Demir emphasized that the IS group's goal was evident with the name it picked for itself. “They were more focused on how to be part of the new balance structure after the fragmentation of Iraq and Syria than the Syrian civil war on its own. After all, Shiites had a more advantageous position after the intervention there in Iraq, and Assad’s unprecedented strength staying in power turned the dynamics of the balance of power in the region to the disadvantage of Salafist Arab countries.”