The ongoing standoff between the West and Russia has opened a debate about excessive personalization in analyses of Vladimir Putin's actions. In trying to explain Putin's motivations in the Ukraine crisis, US Secretary of State John Kerry was quoted as saying to the Wall Street Journal, “[H]e's creating his own reality, and his own sort of world, divorced from a lot of what's real on the ground for all those people, including people in his own country.” Indeed, there is some truth to that, but certain phenomena go beyond the psyche of the Russian ruler and are better explained by “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” George Kennan's 1947 classic for Foreign Affairs. In his article, Kennan presents the shrewd analysis behind the US policy of containment toward the Soviet Union in the postwar era. Although Russian state and society have evolved significantly since that time, the essay is surprisingly topical today in providing important clues about Russian foreign policy patterns in various regions, including the Middle East.

The first pattern is rooted in the history of the Russian presence in the region, which peaked during the Soviet era. The Soviet Union had its own vision of the balance of power in the Middle East and was an integral piece, either as a part of the problem or part of the solution, of almost every security puzzle that arose, including the Suez crisis, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 1967 war and so on. Today’s Russia also wants its voice to be heard, not to mention decisively, in most acute regional issues, be it the Iranian nuclear issue or the Syrian crisis. Although President Barack Obama considers Russia a “regional power” — an assertion that upset many Russians, including decision-makers, which is telling — whenever a grave challenge emerges in the Middle East or anywhere else in the world, Washington can expect little progress if it fails to enlist Moscow’s support, as recently concerning Afghanistan and Iran.

The second pattern can be traced to the Soviet Union’s use of ideology to forge alliances and gain sympathy from local elites in various proxy wars across the Middle East. In this regard, one particular takeaway from Kennan’s essay resonates with the main line of the Kremlin today: “Capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution.” Although capitalism per se is no longer an issue, Western values have come under strong criticism among Russian movers and shakers. Time and again, they have opposed as inappropriate the idea of “universal values as Western liberal values.” Dwelling on this agenda in the Middle East, where many find Western values contradictory to Islam and national traditions, is a way to score points.

The same holds for “imperialism.” Moscow positions itself as a global opponent of “imperial Western policies,” and for now this seems to earn the Kremlin an “easy A” in the region, where perceptions are critical of American anti-terrorist initiatives and democracy promotion. It is yet to be seen, however, whether Russia can succeed as the “world’s moderate conservative leader” in the area. According to the 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Project report, Russia’s lowest public image ratings are found in the Middle East.