A new phase has begun between Russia and America: 25 years of assurances that the Cold War is over and that the United States and Russia are no longer enemies is ending with an open political confrontation over Ukraine. Washington's intention to impose sanctions against Russia threatens to radically change not only the atmosphere of relations but also the nature of their cooperation. For the last year or two, this cooperation has basically been forced anyway, where it was impossible to avoid it — Syria, Afghanistan and Iran. There has been no other agenda since the New START Treaty was ratified and Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).

For Russia, Ukraine is an issue of principle, and cannot be compared with any other issue. As the Russian conservative magazine Expert wrote, "It is impossible to retreat any farther. … For Russia, maintaining our presence in Ukraine means much more than holding the G-8 summit in Sochi and even more than membership in the organization itself." In addition to the cultural-historical and strategic reasons why Ukraine is very important for Moscow, this conflict is the culmination of a quarter-century of politics.

The majority of the population and a considerable part of the Russian establishment has the perception that for all this time (or most of it), the country has regressed, and has been forced to abandon its geopolitical position. In the beginning, because of growing weakness, then because of the collapse of 1991 and the ensuing deep crisis, and then out of caution and in the hope of achieving a "great deal" with the West by diplomatic and economic methods. The widespread opinion in Russia is that it all ended in failure, because neither America nor Europe plans to amicably recognize Russia as an equal partner. Russian President Vladimir Putin is certain that they only understand severity and force, such as that which occurred in 2008. Then, despite the universal indignation about the war in the Caucasus, no real sanctions were imposed, and at the same time, the question of admission of Ukraine and Georgia for NATO membership was withdrawn from the agenda.

The fall of Viktor Yanukovich's regime and the subsequent chaos in Kiev meant the prospect that the future Ukrainian state will be used to take revenge for previous failures of Western policy. It is no accident that everyone unanimously noted the unprecedented achievements of Russian diplomacy in 2013. Putin decided that the costs associated with intervention at this stage will be lower than the risks that Russia will face if Ukraine becomes much more nationalistic with the support of the West and, naturally, becomes a country oriented toward a Euro-Atlantic blueprint.