The Oct. 11 New York Times editorial titled "A Warning to Egypt's Generals" brings into focus the dilemma that the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty presents for the United States in the Middle East. It is a dilemma that emerges as an outcome of the US policy in the region that prioritizes Israel’s security as Israel itself defines it.

The United States tolerated the regimes of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak and sustained its military assistance under the rubric of “US interests in the region.” This treaty, as I have mentioned in earlier blogs, removed the strategic role of Egypt as the primary deterrent to Israel’s persistent denial of Palestinian national and human rights.

This explains how the ongoing, creeping settlements in the Palestinian territories were repeatedly shielded by the US veto or its threat to veto in the United Nations. In other words, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty drastically upset the balance of power at a time when the United States, while eagerly sponsoring “negotiations,” had transformed them into a series of endless and often futile discussions until now. Since then, while UN resolutions repeatedly defined the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as occupied, Israel never found itself bound by the terms of the fourth Geneva Conventions.

With the changes that have taken place in Egypt since January 2011, the dynamism that the Egyptian people manifested unfortunately did not have a clear and coherent sense of direction. President Mohammed Morsi’s election was a positive outcome. The one year of his regime’s performance did not clearly respond to the basic needs and rights of the postrevolution period, which gradually eroded the legitimacy of his tenure.