President Obama’s dodging and weaving in response to political pressure to cut US military assistance to Egypt may not seem heroic, but it may be the correct strategy, or at least the beginning of one.

A balance between US strategic concerns and the interests of Egyptians, including both civilians and the armed forces, is possible and the means to achieve it is revision of the assistance program.

Military assistance was initially provided to Egypt as a reward for reaching and preserving peace with Israel. As that peace took hold in the 1980s, rendering thoughts of war virtually inconceivable on both sides, the primary purpose of the assistance shifted. The Carter Doctrine, declared in January 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, initiated the direct projection into the Persian Gulf of US military power. That projection has expanded dramatically. 

A brief look at a map reveals that Egypt is the only secure maritime and air gateway to the Gulf. US investment of some $40 billion of military assistance in Egypt has vastly reduced the logistical costs of maintaining what is now some 20,000 military personnel under Central Command, comprised of about 10,000 navy sailors and Marines, 6,000 air force airmen and 4,000 army soldiers. Expedited passage through the Suez Canal is important, but at least equally vital to CENTCOM’s mission is overflight permission, more than 36,000 requests for which were granted between 2001 and 2005, a rate now somewhat reduced but still remarkably high.