It tends to be forgotten, but in the fall of 1998 Turkey and Syria almost went to war. The crisis started when Gen. Atilla Ates, commander of the Turkish land forces, spoke near the Syrian border on Sept. 16. Ates, called on Damascus to expel Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the militant group that had been fighting the Turkish government since 1984. The drums of war echoed throughout the Middle East as Turkish tanks seemed poised to roll into Syria. Unwilling to go to war, the government of Hafez al-Assad, father of the current Syrian president, complied with Ankara’s demand and expelled Ocalan. Turkey would capture its public enemy number one in February 1999, five months after Ates’ speech.

Today, Ankara’s enthusiasm for possible US airstrikes against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad makes one realize how Turkey’s Syrian odyssey has come full circle since that fateful fall of 1998. Even as US military action against Syria is becoming more likely, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu are disappointed that their Western and Middle Eastern allies are unwilling to use all means necessary to quickly topple the Assad regime. Five lessons from the 1998 episode and its aftermath could help Ankara devise policies more in tune with its national interests in Syria.

The first lesson is to connect available means to achievable goals. Although Ankara did not have all the resources to single-handedly overwhelm the Syrian military in 1998, it managed to convince Damascus otherwise by conveying an image to Assad that it, indeed, had the necessary tools. When one compares that with the Erdogan government’s response to Syrian attacks against Turkish jetfighters and border towns since last year, it becomes clear that Ankara may have already lost the military initiative. Today, with Turkey trying to goad its Western allies into attacking the Assad government rather than flexing its own muscles, the Syrian regime cannot take its northern neighbor seriously.

The second lesson is that one should always allow one’s enemy a graceful exit. In 1998, Turkey asked Syria to choose between two unpalatable options: give up its PKK trump card or face military action. Choosing the lesser of two evils, the elder Assad gave up Ocalan and his followers. Even as it pressured Assad, however, Turkey gave the Syrian leader an opportunity to normalize relations, which took place soon after the crisis died down.