About six weeks ago, fresh after President Mohammed Morsi’s ouster and at the height of the pro-Morsi sit-ins at the Rab’ia al-Adawiyya mosque and Ennahda square, I wrote debating where the Brotherhood stood then, what it appeared to be facing, what strategy it seemed to be employing and what were the options at its disposal. Since then, the situation has, well, incredibly and dramatically changed. 

The administration in Cairo has since decided to take a confrontational approach toward the Brotherhood. The two sit-ins have been broken up by the police in a tumultuous day, and the confrontation that day and after has left a death toll in the hundreds and a much larger number of injuries among the pro-Morsi ranks. Morsi remains detained and has reportedly just been referred to the criminal court over charges of incitement of violence. Almost the entire top leadership of the Brotherhood has been apprehended (including the Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie and his deputy Khairat el-Shater) and is being investigated over charges such as the incitement of violence. Many within the second-tier leadership have been apprehended as well, while a sizeable number of supporters were arrested with official reasoning being allegations of connection to violence. The heated, volatile response by the more radical elements on the pro-Morsi side following the dispersal of the sit-ins — which involved more open use of violence as well as the attacks on churches and other reports of sectarian attacks — have made the public perception of the entire camp even more unfavorable and have weakened some nascent sympathies, especially within a hostile media environment.

The predominant tone in the media remains increasingly confrontational, the pro-Morsi side continues to be presented as “terrorists” and figures speaking of any form of political reconciliation are increasingly being cast as unpatriotic or even “Brotherhood sleeper agents.” The prime minister’s recent, somewhat reconciliatory statements and the deputy prime minister’s somewhat dovish initiative were both met with considerable backlash. The leading Salafist party, Al-Nour, has further distanced itself from the Brotherhood, and is partaking in the political road map set by the military and has joined the 50-strong constitutional amendments committee. The only Brotherhood-friendly outlet, Al Jazeera, is seeing its Egypt-specific channel become the subject of a popularly backed suspension campaign and is being taken off the air. The Brotherhood’s non-Islamist, former January revolution allies are now either in support of the crackdown, or a minority standing against both the Brotherhood and the administration in Cairo, or others perhaps willing to go as far as being critical of the current situation in one way or another but would seemingly never align with the Brotherhood ever again. 

The public largely appears to be moving on, and if recent local polls are to be believed, a majority seems to be on the side of the administration. A recent Baseera poll for example put 67% in support of the dispersal of the sit-ins that took place, 24% against, while 9% remain unsure. In fact, whether out of exhaustion or actual shift in mind-set, one could observe more and more people increasingly returning to “normal” and non-political conversations in these most abnormal and political of times, though this obviously remains highly anecdotal and observational.