While parts of Iraq and neighboring states have become entrenched in terrorism and political unrest, the Kurdistan Region remains relatively unscathed, reinforcing the northern enclave’s sense of security. Tourism to the Kurdish north peaked during the recent Eid holiday, while border trade and the energy sector has continued to expand. Even the extension of Massoud Barzani’s presidency of the region for another two years without elections failed to elicit a public uprising, despite ongoing criticism from opposition groups and individuals.

Yet underneath the relative calm is a silent revolution emerging on the Kurdish streets, shaped by the region’s rapid and uneven socioeconomic and political changes. This revolution is being conducted through media debates and face-to-face discussions, and in reaction to the rising authoritarianism, absence of financial transparency and increasingly evident gap between the haves and the have-nots in Kurdish society. While these challenges are unlikely to bring about regime change at present, they are raising public awareness and pressures for political reform. Moreover, they coexist with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)'s growing dependency on revenues to co-opt society, posing serious challenges to the internal sovereignty and stability of the region in the medium to long term.

Indeed, opposition voices have been emerging in the Kurdistan Region since the Kurdish civil war in the mid-1990s, either through Islamic parties, nonpartisan individuals, small groupings mainly in Sulaimaniyah province and more recently, the Change (Goran) Movement. Thus far, most have challenged the monopolization of power by the region’s two ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In their willingness to challenge traditional power structures, these opposition groups also have de-linked Kurdish nationalism from blind loyalty to the Kurdish leadership. It is not uncommon today to hear ardent Kurdish nationalists criticize the KRG as “Baathist” and some of its leaders as “Little Saddams.”

Growing opposition activity — including water-bottle throwing and fistfights in the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament — has not, however, led to regime change. While effectively challenging the status quo and garnering popular support, opposition groups — particularly the Change Movement — have been unable to act as a viable political alternative to the KRG because they cannot penetrate the region’s deeply rooted patronage networks. Without access to significant revenues and charismatic leadership, opposition voices cannot provide what has become increasingly essential for political support and control: provision of public services, salaries and security. During the 2009 provincial council elections, for instance, many youth that criticized the KDP and PUK voted for the Kurdistan Alliance anyway because they needed to “assure their parents’ salaries.”