By the end of the most tumultuous 72 hours in Egypt’s recent memory — at least since the January 2011 revolution — hundreds, according to conservative official counts, are dead (including the son of General Guide Mohammed Badie, the daughter of Mohammed El-Beltagy and the grandson of the Brotherhood's founder Hassan El-Banna), and thousands are injured on the pro-Morsi side. More than 40 police members are dead, hundreds have been arrested and a few dozen churches attacked or torched amongst other sectarian-based attacks — the sheer volume of which is unprecedented (the army has said it plans to restore the damaged churches with its own resources). Buildings (government or otherwise) set ablaze, violent clashes taking place all over Cairo and the rest of Egypt, a strict and eerie curfew imposed upon most governorates, an incredible combination of impassioned cheers, deep shock and general gloom. It is still almost impossible to digest it all.

In fact, the volume, magnitude and velocity of events is beyond the capability of anyone alone right now to document, fathom or fully analyze. The somber chain of events occurring right now will probably last at least a few more days in one form or another and will have long-term tremors. And the one thing Egypt has increasingly forced upon observers is that it is almost impossible to predict anything with full confidence, at least anything of a long-term bearing. Yet, as things stand, one can try to make some preliminary readings, posing more questions than answers.

The current official political roadmap might now find itself subject to at least a time extension of some sort, if not stronger and more profound adjustments altogether. Anyone still hoping for a political process that includes the Brotherhood might as well recognize that this is now anything but likely. Between the prevailing antagonistic mood in the current administration and its supporters on one hand, and the pro-Morsi camp’s misadventures, strategic errors or blunders, as well as the mounting state of shock and anger inside the pro-Brotherhood base now, on the other, it is pretty much impossible to see any reconciliation taking place soon. In fact, the way things stand, the question of the continued existence of the Brotherhood itself suddenly feels less of an exaggeration than before.

The cabinet even announced today it was considering legally dissolving the Brotherhood (likely referring to the Brotherhood NGO registered in March, given the legal ban on the Brotherhood since 1954 had remarkably never been officially lifted) while the presidential spokesperson today gave what was seen as a largely inconclusive answer to that question. But, assuming any theoretical official decision to fully isolate the Brotherhood politically, how could that even effectively take place? Would at least the more junior and less influential Brotherhood members — a group whose most modest estimations are at least a few hundred thousand and a wider base of supporters — still be allowed to run in elections and be politically involved? Would political Islam struggle to maintain official political representation in post-June 30 Egypt, or would the difficulties essentially focus on the Brotherhood and allies?