One month ago, on June 30, millions of Egyptians took to the streets to demand that President Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood relinquish power. Only a few days later, they got what they wanted, albeit in a manner that has been, to put it mildly, cause for controversy, locally and internationally. Today, a complex and, in many ways, increasingly unsustainable reality seems to be evolving in Egypt.
A deadly spiral of violence — involving (sometimes-armed) Morsi supporters, (sometimes-armed) opposing civilians, as well as (always-armed) security services, which have used excessive force — is growing and becoming more precarious. Each violent incident generates endless debate over who provoked or initiated the clash, who was armed with what, who did what during the course of the confrontation and whether the police response was justified. There is also real concern about a possible rise in sectarian violence, with a few incidents in particular setting off alarms, including a late-July clash involving a Port Said church.
There is a genuine problem with obtaining "facts" in regard to violent incidents, and for that matter, everything else going on in the country. The private media, which had been increasingly subjected to intimidation and heavy pressure by Morsi and the Brotherhood, has been unabashedly biased — fierce in its anti-Brotherhood rhetoric and coverage of its demonstrations, while staunchly pro-military and pro-new order.
The Islamist broadcast channels remain "suspended," officially because of concerns about the use of inciting and sectarian language, with no clear, announced plan as to how their fates will be determined. In addition, neither Al Jazeera nor the new, makeshift pro-Brotherhood Ahrar 25 channel are unbiased sources. Meanwhile, official sources on both sides are, well, as reliable as official sources can be.
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