To understand Qatar is to understand angst. The leadership in Qatar’s first order of business, after Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani deposed his father to take the throne in 1995, was to ensure its sovereignty both domestically and internationally. After many years of following the Saudi narrative, the new emir decided to pursue a different set of policies that would ensure the recognition of this new chapter. To complicate matters further, Qatar’s main gas field was one it had to share with Iran, a country that didn’t always see eye-to-eye with Saudi Arabia, to say the least. Qatar was stuck between a rock and a hard place. It had to pursue bold and radical tactics to ensure its survival. Like many city-states with indefensible borders and a negligible defense force facing existential threats, Qatar decided to become indispensable to everyone.

To achieve this, it embarked on all kinds of projects … and there was initial success. The cultural and educational projects — the foundation, the museums, the film commission and festival and the universities — were meant to present Qatar as the Arab world’s beckoning beacon of enlightenment. Its cash-backed political reconciliatory projects in Lebanon, Palestine and Sudan served as a portfolio of temporarily bought allies — pricing those acquisitions is a whole other matter. Its economic aid to and investment in Europe was meant to frame it as a financial savior. Its sport-hosting projects, such as the Asian Games and World Cup, were meant to increase the recognition of Qatar in the international community and the global consumer audience.

This attempt at indispensability had one clear and specific goal: the preservation of the state and its borders. If Qatar could become the model city-state of what Arabs could be, the West wouldn’t allow it to fall. And if, however temporarily, some regional players felt they needed it, too, well that would also help. Qatar had no choice and everyone understood that, though few sympathized. One story goes something like this: When Qatar hosted the Asian Games in 2006, the emir invited Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the opening ceremonies. The emir was explaining to the Iranian president how Qatar was a neutral state that only wished to foster peace in the region. Ahmadinejad responded that it wouldn’t be so neutral when the Americans struck Iran from their base in Al Udeid. Never mind, Qatar still seemed like a gifted tightrope walker.

Then the Arab Spring came, and Qatar’s plans suddenly expanded. Sure, Qatar — along with the Muslim Brotherhood — believed that the events of Sept. 11, 2001, had presented an opportunity to play the role of a more moderate version of Islam as a counter to al-Qaeda’s extremist interpretation — and possibly the new Arab ally of America. But the Arab Spring expanded those possibilities and with them the ambitions of Qatar. It no longer wanted to hedge its bets; it wanted to be the market maker.