The decisive victory of Hassan Rouhani in the June 14 presidential election caught many politicians and commentators by surprise. Iran experts have tried not only to understand the reasons for voter participation, but also predict the foreign policy attitudes and behaviors of the new man in charge of Iran’s executive branch. It has been argued that the election results should be interpreted as an expression of dissatisfaction of the people of Iran with the growing unemployment, high inflation and other economic problems caused by the enormous politico-economic pressures that the Western world and particularly the United States have been exerting on Iran. However, this may not be  the whole story, and in fact others have asserted that many voters demonstrated their desire for more government accountability, strengthening citizens’ organizations and the de-securitization of the public sphere.

In the absence of nationwide public opinion surveys, we cannot be certain which factor or complex set of factors led to one of the highest voter turnout rates (72%) in Iranian presidential elections, and encouraged almost 51% of the voters to cast their ballots in favor of Rouhani. It is indisputable that a more moderate government will emerge in Tehran, and one can expect a president who will use less fiery rhetoric and move toward tension reduction with the Arab states and the major world powers. Rouhani is likely to select a team of experienced top Iranian diplomats and experts who will most probably drive Iran’s foreign — and also nuclear — policy in a different direction. The decisions made will be based on an assessment of present and future risks to the country’s political system and economic development.

One of the biggest dangers now is that the United States and its allies will misinterpret this significant political shift in Iran as an indication of widespread disillusionment among the Iranian public toward the “clerical regime.” Instead of taking advantage of the opportunity of negotiating with the new Iranian leader, they might continue talking about the controversial “regime change” option which many in the West have openly or covertly been advocating for a long time. They might assume that increasing the external pressure on Iran would accelerate the regime change by the frustrated Iranian people, who would overthrow the clerical regime. Indeed, those who think about this revolution do not know that the vast majority of the Iranians, particularly the younger generations, do not have any appetite for a “revolution,” are wary of  wars and look to the conflict situations in the periphery of Iran — in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria — with uneasiness. This politically ill-defined goal of regime change casts dark clouds over the issue to the point that one may have difficulties in finding where things are or should be.

If the West, Russia and the regional powers are interested in a more peaceful regional security environment; they should avoid hindering the new president’s efforts to have a country that is more economically viable and politically inclined to be more ready for cooperation with the regional states and world powers.