The crisis in Syria is clearly getting out of control. Refugees threaten to overwhelm neighboring countries, Israel’s Air Force has struck government targets, the regime has been accused of using chemical weapons and outside militias have joined the Syrian combatants in an increasingly brutal stalemate. The time is now for the international community to take action. But, in the absence of serious multilateral diplomacy, simply arming the opposition and enforcing a no-fly zone, as most American pundits and politicians argue, will only prolong the bloodshed. Obama has been right to push for negotiations with Russia, the Assad regime and the opposition. Peace in Syria will only come with a US-led international effort that includes Russia, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Assad regime, the opposition and others. 

The view that arming rebels or enforcing a no-fly zone will hasten regime defeat fails to take into account Syria’s complex makeup and the mindset of the belligerents. Perhaps 20% to 40% of the Syrian population (mainly minority Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Druse and many Sunni middle- and upper-class members) supports the Assad regime because they have convinced themselves, rightly or wrongly, that they face extermination if the rebels win. The Assad propaganda machine encourages this alarm. Regardless of the validity of this fear, it drives these minority groups to regard Assad’s survival as synonymous with their own. Thus, military support measures to the rebels will only build solidarity among regime supporters as well as straining America’s military.  

In fact, our personalization of the regime in Syria as “Assad’s regime” leads to bad analysis; the Baathi regime and the Alawite military power structure predate the elder Assad’s takeover in 1970 and are still very much alive. There is little reason to believe that Assad’s departure from the scene will lead to regime collapse. However, even the most partisan regime supporter could live with his departure if convinced that it would lead to an acceptable modus vivendi in Syria. While there are many details to resolve, the end result must be a structure that guarantees the safety of all elements of Syria’s population.

Likewise, the plurality in Lebanon, large minorities in Turkey, the majority of Iraqis and many Jordanians all either support the Syrian regime or regard its survival as the lesser of two evils. In this way, the conflict in Syria is actually representative of larger sectarian power struggles in the region. Its outcome could greatly impact the politics of the region for years to come. Pressing this fact is in no way a defense of the Assad regime. Rather, it sheds light on the complexities of the situation and underscores the need to organize the most important international players to impose a cease-fire and a transitional regime from without. Left to their own devices, the internal players see the civil war as a zero-sum game.