In recent years, Gulf-Asian relations have intensified in numerous economic sectors. Emblematic of such a trend is Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s 2009 statement: “China is coming, India is coming. ... I don’t know if America and Europe will still be leading.” For some, this Gulf-Asian rapprochement is the result of a Western retreat from its traditional areas of influence and the necessity for Gulf monarchies to look for alternative partners, not to mention security providers, among the rising powers in Asia, in particular India and China.

However, the view of an emerging Gulf-Asian strategic nexus downplays many substantial contradictions. In the Gulf as well as in Asia, countries have framed regional power plays as an either/or game. In the Gulf, the Iran matrix is the cornerstone of GCC foreign policy, the ultimate consequence being that cooperating in any domain with the Iranian regime is understood to be a stance against the GCC.

In South Asia, the longstanding India-Pakistan rivalry is also seen as a kind of either/or game. For Islamabad, the pillar of its international relations is the principle of “strategic parity,” which posits that the imbalance between Pakistan and India — in other words, the latter’s military superiority — heightens the risk of conflict. Pakistan has thus continuously condemned foreign arms sales to India while justifying its own weapons development and arms purchases in the name of this “strategic parity.”

The GCC sees any cooperation with Iran by other countries as damaging to the GCC; similarly, India and Pakistan see any outside party’s partnership with the other as detrimental to its national security. Still, Gulf-Asian relationships that have developed in recent years are puzzling to those examining the either/or mindsets of the GCC, India and Pakistan. For example, India and China have reinforced economic and political relations with Saudi Arabia, strengthened military ties with Israel and also maintained cooperation with Iran. And Saudi Arabia’s ties with India, Pakistan and China all have been strengthened despite the competition inside this triangle. In reality, these contradictory relationships demonstrate the reluctance of Gulf and Asian countries to think strategically about Gulf-Asian rapprochement.