Last week’s visit by US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to Cairo came amid several discussions in Washington and Cairo about US leverage in Egyptian politics since Hosni Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011. Most of these discussions overestimate US influence. Indeed, last month’s proposed amendments from both Republican and Democratic senators aiming to attach conditions to military assistance to Egypt reveal an old-fashioned and overconfident understanding of Washington’s sway. The reality is that US influence in Egypt is tempered by a number of factors, including Egyptian domestic politics, funding and the United States’ own need for stability and cooperation in the region. Deconstructing a number of myths that perpetuate the idea of an all-powerful United States may help bring to light the reality of the situation.

Myth  No. 1: The United States has many cards it can play to affect Egyptian domestic politics.

Though it is true that during Mubarak’s presidency Egypt submitted to Washington’s interests on a number of regional issues, the fact remains that Mubarak did not hesitate to assert his authority on the domestic front. For example, despite protests from President George W. Bush, the US press and the US Congress, Mubarak imprisoned Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a US citizen and human rights activist, as well as Ayman Nour, his opponent in the 2005 presidential election. Mubarak did not yield until he voluntarily dropped charges and released Nour in 2009 as a friendly gesture toward the newly elected President Barack Obama.

This streak of independent defiance has perhaps increased in the post-uprising period. Egypt’s domestic political scene now consists of new alliances, competitors and negotiations — all within its own borders. During Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Cairo in March 2013, he encouraged the opposition to participate in the elections and President Mohammed Morsi to accept the terms of the proposed International Monerary Fund (IMF) loan. But it is not clear whether they will accept his advice. The opposition will likely continue to boycott the elections, and Morsi will likely be unable to conform to the IMF conditions. Domestic pressures are dominating these decisions, not Washington’s desires.