On March 21, as Turkey’s Kurds were celebrating the arrival of spring, a cease-fire came into effect between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Kurdish militant group. In the course of the debilitating 30-year conflict, this is not the first time that the two sides have agreed to take a break from killing, but it may well be the last. If ongoing negotiations between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and representatives of the Kurdish movement proceed as planned, they could produce a permanent settlement that would alter Turkey's core socio-political dynamics as well as those of the wider region. In a sense, such a change is already in the making. Here is a snapshot of how this "brave new Turkey" might look:

The new Turkey is pragmatic. Pragmatism lies at the heart of the country’s foreign policy under the AKP government. Shifting perceptions of geopolitical interests pushed Turkey’s decision makers to improve relations with Iran and Syria prior to the Arab uprisings, and then to abandon them and to side with a constellation of US-backed Sunni actors following the outbreak of the Syrian crisis. Calculations of regional influence, security concerns and energy cooperation help explain Turkey’s deteriorating ties with Israel in recent years, as well as the nascent rapprochement between the two governments at present.

Likewise, the Turkish government’s sudden decision to jumpstart negotiations with Kurdish militants in January, following nearly two years of intense fighting and militaristic rhetoric, should be interpreted within the context of Ankara’s deepening trade, energy and diplomatic relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq and the PKK’s apparent influence over Syria’s autonomy-seeking Kurdish minority. Faced with the risk of antagonizing an increasingly assertive Kurdish population both within and outside its borders, the Turkish government has instead taken the pragmatic route of trying to win them over permanently.

None of this means that emotions and ideological inclinations don't factor into Ankara's policy-making, but rather that these tend to be synchronized with basic calculations of strategic interest. When they do clash, pragmatism usually prevails.