It is with a measure of nonchalance that the Lebanese have trusted Western declarations in favor of stability in Lebanon. After the Oct. 17, 2012, assassination of Maj. Gen. Wissam al-Hassan and the events that followed, the ambassadors of five United Nations Security Council countries rushed — one might recall — to the Baabda palace to affirm the commitment of their countries to maintaining the current government to ensure stability.

Arming themselves with this unusual approach, the Lebanese believed they could let anything go, opening their country to foul winds without endangering their stability. This discourse, which sought to incite sectarian discord and hatred, multiplied (because of the electoral campaign), while those propagating it failed to consider anything but their own narrow interests. They truly seemed to be playing with fire. Today, however, the security situation has become a constant worry, and the incidents in the north and south are escalating, affecting the capital Beirut.

All at once, the situation along the Lebanese-Syrian border has quickly deteriorated. Meanwhile in Sidon, Sheik Ahmad al-Assir is increasing his provocations and in Beirut sticks of dynamite and bombs explode throughout the night. These incidents are accompanied by inflammatory discourse that goes so far as to call for Sunni soldiers to leave the army to protect the Sunnis against Hezbollah. In a single day, for example, Assir provoked a situation in Abra (close to Sidon), Sheik Dai al-Chahal went from Tripoli to Majdel Anjar, the Islamist camp at Roumieh prison saw a revolt, and Sheik Hisham Khalife, a confidant of Lebanon’s Grand Mufti, was forced to leave his rostrum at the Mohammad al-Amin Mosque in Beirut because of protesters close to the Future Movement.

Officially, the government has given full coverage to the army to ensure security. But the fact of the matter is that the army is being denigrated and associated more and more by certain sheiks and deputies with Hezbollah and Iran. The situation is thus more serious than it was in 1975, when there had never before been a more incendiary discourse between communities, particularly between the Sunnis and Shiites. This is why it is no longer a matter of mere talk or politicking to mobilize the electorate, but an actual plan that seeks to provoke discord between Sunnis and Shiites throughout the region — from Iraq, passing through Syria, and all the way to Lebanon. The direct questioning of the army at this point is a conclusive sign.