Almost all political analysis and commentary dealing with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ask the same question: “Is he finally ready to cross the Rubicon?” In other words, has he finally reached the stage in his political evolution when he'll abandon personal survival and immediate benefit in favor of advancing greater goals?

History has taught us that the answer to this question is a resounding no. It is difficult to recall sweeping changes or reality-changing moves that Netanyahu promoted in his seven years as prime minister (three years in the 1990s and another four in the term of office he just completed). After watching how Netanyahu functions as prime minister over a long term, the impression is of a man who is not ready for or interested in leading revolutions. It is doubtful whether the son of the renowned historian — Benzion Netanyahu, who passed away last year — will ever be mentioned in the history books as a history-changing leader. Netanyahu is not Julius Caesar; he is not the type who crosses the Rubicon. Each time he could have crossed it, he instead preferred to make an elegant U-turn.

It is not as if he can't — he just doesn't want to. As finance minister in former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s government, Netanyahu didn't hesitate to lead revolutionary processes and wrestle with entire sectors in the public. Sharon gave him his full backing, and Netanyahu slashed child allowances, opened the ports to competition, wrested pension funds away from the banks and extracted the economy from a deep recession. He also paid a steep political price for that term of office in the treasury. Since then he has preferred, as much as possible, to take no chances and to avoid at all costs any shocks that could undermine his position.

Several times in his previous tenure, Netanyahu reached junctions when he had to decide between a dramatic move or maintaining the status quo. In each case, he chose the tried-and-true over risk-taking. That is what happened in his choice between freezing construction in the settlements and promoting the political process, or preserving his coalition. The exact same pattern emerged half a year ago when he preferred the tried-and-true alliance with the ultra-Orthodox over partnership with the centrist Kadima and real reform in the burden-equality issue.