The Egyptian opposition appeared to be exhausted at the start of the new year. The energy its members had exhibited a year ago, despite disappointing parliamentary election results, seems to have dissipated.

The problem is not so much that they have been beaten. Indeed, in some areas, they have done well for a relatively nascent political force. Rather, it is that they have failed to learn from the last two years and build upon what has been accomplished so far. In the coming months, opposition forces need to examine the numbers from their past electoral performances and from there expand their geographic base of support by delivering their message in the context of Egyptian voters’ key priorities.

The results of the post-Mubarak elections held thus far — the constitutional referendum (early 2011), parliamentary elections (2011/2012) and presidential elections (2012) — testify to the opposition’s core supporters. In the constitutional referendum, the Muslim Brotherhood backed the ruling military council’s “transitional road map,” while most of those who comprise the opposition today rallied against it.

The results of that vote indicate two things. First, the opposition’s primary bases of support are in Alexandria, Cairo and Giza as well as Asyut, Gharbia, Daqahliyya and Minya. In these governorates, Egyptians cast 20–40% of their votes “no.” Second, the average Egyptian voter, as early as March 2011, was looking primarily for stability, which explains how the “yes” camp managed to mobilize 78% of the electorate to vote for the road map.