Although the Syrian crisis continues, Kurdish groups have not become the decisive minority to help overthrow the Assad regime. Most demand Kurdish rights in the Syrian state; however, their nationalist goals have become part of regional proxy wars, sectarian tensions, and competing cross-border nationalism. The Syrian Kurdish opposition now involves relations with Ankara and other Kurdish groups as much as Damascus. While the Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) has entered the conflict alongside Assad and against Turkey, Iraqi Kurds have intervened on behalf of Ankara and their own nationalist interests.  These cross-cutting links will not only stifle a unified Syrian Kurdish movement, but they will likely create new opportunities for group conflict and border instability.

The Syrian Kurdish opposition is ineffective because it is targeting multiple fronts — the Assad regime, the Syrian opposition, Turkey, and fellow Kurds — that reinforce its disunity. Anti-regime sentiment is rooted in the discriminatory policies of Syrian Arab Baathism that excluded Kurds on an ethnic basis while assimilating them as Syrians, tribal chiefs and public officials. A shared sense of Kurdish ethno-nationalism certainly emerged; however; it fragmented between different socio-economic groups. This is why many Kurds have created the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and will not support the Sunni-Arab based Free Syrian Army, while others who have assimilated into the Syrian state have refrained from opposition politics altogether.

Nor do most Syrian Kurds support The Muslim-Brotherhood influenced Syrian National Council (SNC), the main opposition group based in Istanbul. Turkey’s inability to resolve its own Kurdish problem under the AK party has left Syrian Kurds worried of a similar fate under SNC rule. These anti-Turkish sentiments also reflect the significant PKK representation among Syrian Kurds — approximately one-third of rank-and-file members — and the group’s renewed alliance of convenience with Assad.  The PKK’s increasingly active role in Syria has not only hardened Turkey’s security concerns, but has reinforced intra-Kurdish tensions. The PKK and its local Syrian branch, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), continue to recriminate against fellow Kurds opposing Assad.

Further complicating the situation are Iraqi Kurds, who have deep-rooted institutional and tribal patronage networks in Damascus and the al-Jazira region. The two main Iraqi Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have operated in Syria for over three decades, alongside their local branches, with the tacit agreement of Assad and his security apparatus.  Even after Iraqi Kurdish president Masoud Barzani started to support regime change, Iraqi Kurdish influence in Syria continued. Barzani has reached out to KDP-tribal loyalists, independents and youth groups in his attempt to secure leadership among Syrian Kurds and counter PKK support.