Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s deployment of special Tigris Forces to Iraq’s disputed territories has renewed concerns about armed conflict between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). For many, Maliki’s actions have violated the constitution, provoked Erbil and further threatened Iraqi state stability.

Yet, the source of the problem is not entirely in Baghdad. Since 2003, KRG officials have engaged in what Arab Iraqis consider as their own “Illegal, unconstitutional and provocative” actions: unilaterally moving the Kurdish militia (Peshmerga) into disputed lands, signing oil contracts in contentious areas and bringing the Kurdish north into regional power struggles. These actions may have currently checked central-government power in the territories, but they also have left the KRG internally divided, without allies in Baghdad and increasingly dependent upon Ankara for its economic and political future. 

The recent dispute is a byproduct of an ambiguous Iraqi constitution, Kurdish political ambitions and Baghdad’s attempt to re-assert its sovereignty. Since 2003, the KRG has taken advantage of the dysfunctional Iraqi government by placing large swaths of disputed lands under its own jurisdiction. In creating new facts on the ground, the KRG has redrawn internal boundaries and encouraged important demographic shifts — all to the Kurdistan region’s favor. Over time, these territories placed under Kurdish Peshmerga control have become sources of energy wealth and KRG bargaining chips with Baghdad if and when the time comes for negotiation. 

Still, the Tigris Forces represent a symbolic victory for Maliki in his attempts to appease Sunni Arab groups and not to be seen solely as a Shia leader. Since the disputed territories are largely in Sunni Arab-majority and “mixed” provinces, the forces represent Maliki’s willingness to re-empower Sunni Arabs disenfranchised by de-Baathification policies. These groups and their cohorts in Baghdad may be critical of Maliki’s centralized power, but they are Iraqi nationalists committed to assuring that the territories remain part of Iraq and not the Kurdistan region. Maliki’s courting of Sunni Arabs also may reflect his preparations for a potential regime change in Syria and the regional spillover of Sunni Muslim influence into Iraq.