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How can Russia, Turkey reach deal on Idlib?

In the run-up to the Turkish president's visit to Moscow, few options may be on the table with regard to Syria's Idlib.

A Syrian army soldier smokes cigarette as he sits on a military vehicle in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib, Syria August 24, 2019. REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki - RC13C4D5FE50
A Syrian army soldier smokes a cigarette as he sits on a military vehicle in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib, Syria, Aug. 24, 2019. — REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki

The successful offensive by Russia-backed forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad has driven the Syrian opposition and the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from Khan Sheikhoun and surrounding areas on the southern edge of the Idlib de-escalation zone. The offensive also blocked Turkey's No. 9 Morek observation post.

Moscow and Ankara each accused the other of violating the Sochi memorandum. Ankara insists it does not intend to move either this observation post, which had found itself trapped behind the Syrian army, or other posts. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will travel to Moscow Aug. 27 to meet with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to discuss the situation on the ground.

The further implementation of the 2018 Sochi memorandum in rebel-held Idlib will merely send Russian-Turkish relations into a downward spiral of confrontation and tension. As of now, Ankara has no capacity to deal with HTS in Idlib. It is not able to force the extremists to retreat at least 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the safe zone, which was stipulated by the September deal. Moscow, in turn, is unable to counter Damascus’ efforts to advance into the de-escalation zone and reestablish control over some areas. It also uses Ankara’s failure to prevent Idlib-based rebels from firing missiles at the Russian Khmeimim air base as a pretext for helping the Syrian regime in its military operations. Turkey dismisses such steps as violations of the Sochi agreement. 

The situation, however, is such that even the elimination of Idlib-based HTS militants would not prompt Damascus to reconsider its plan to militarily bring the territory under its control. The Syrian regime does not discriminate between HTS and the moderate opposition, as all those who rose up against Assad are considered terrorists. The fact that eastern Ghouta saw up to 20,000 moderate fighters and mere hundreds of HTS militants did not shield the suburb from the Syrian army's disastrous attack in 2018, which was backed by Russia.

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