Skip to main content

Tight IAEA Inspection Regime Hampers Iran's Nuclear Breakout

IAEA Deputy Director Herman Nackaerts says his agency would know "within a week" if Iran tried to divert uranium for higher enrichment.

A general view of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, 250 km (150 miles) south of Tehran, March 30, 2005. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami Khatami took a group of journalists deep underground on Wednesday into the heart of the nuclear plant which Washington wants dismantled and whose existence was kept secret until 2002. REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi  RH/CN - RTR6JAI
A general view of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, 250 km (150 miles) south of Tehran, March 30, 2005. — REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi

As Iran prepares to inaugurate a new president, those suspicious of Iran’s nuclear intentions have warned that Hassan Rouhani will be merely a smarter version of his predecessor and drag out negotiations while the country secretly builds a bomb.

However, Iran’s ability to break out or sneak out of its non-proliferation obligations is hampered by an inspection regime that keeps extremely close track of Iranian uranium enrichment facilities.

Herman Nackaerts, the deputy director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and head of its Department of Safeguards, told Al-Monitor during a visit to Washington that “we would know within a week” whether Iran was diverting uranium from declared sites and seeking to enrich it to weapons’ grade level.

There are two to six IAEA inspectors on the ground in Iran every day, Nackaerts said, covering 16 Iranian facilities. On average, he said, that means that an inspector visits Iran’s enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow once a week. If there are suspicions about any improper activities, they can go more often, he added.

SUBSCRIBER EXCLUSIVE

Continue reading this exclusive analysis

Original reporting and analysis unavailable elsewhere. Subscribe to AL-MONITOR to read this story and access everything we publish