

## **REPUBLICAN AMENDMENTS**

Barrasso 1 – prohibit funding to implement a nuclear agreement unless a resolution of approval is signed into law.

Barrasso 2 – adds certification requirement that any sanctions relief will not facilitate Iran's ability to support acts of terrorism or develop nuclear weapons.

Barrasso 3 – prohibit the President from taking any action involving statutory sanctions relief unless Congress adopts a joint resolution of approval.

Barrasso 4 – extend the congressional review period from 60 calendar days to 60 session days, prohibits sanctions relief until resolution of approval is enacted, and provides for expedited process for resolution of approval/disapproval

Rubio 6 – require certification that Iran's leaders have publically accepted Israel's right to exist

Rubio 1 – Requires certification that Iran has not carried out acts of terrorism against Israel or Israelis

Rubio 2 – Irrespective of a nuclear agreement, the US should continue to impose new sanctions and enforce existing sanctions on Iran b/c of ongoing support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program, and its human rights abuses

Rubio 3 – the President may not support efforts at the UN to repeal or modify UNSC resolutions dealing with Iran during the congressional review period, or if all the certifications requirements cannot be met that pertain to providing sanctions relief following a final agreement

Rubio 4 – to require certification that no sanctions relief would undermine sanctions imposed in connection with support for terrorism, ballistic missile programs or human rights abuses

Rubio 5 – Sense of Congress that enabling the UN to consider an agreement prior to Congress would undermine the role of Congress

Johnson 1 – Any agreement reached with Iran relating to their nuclear program is deemed to be a treaty (67 vote or 2/3<sup>rd</sup> threshold)

Johnson 2 – any agreement reached with Iran relating to their nuclear program is deemed to be a congressional-executive agreement that requires approval by the Senate and House under expedited procedures (51/majority of members voting)

Johnson 3 – Deems that the agreement with Iran requires approval by Congress (60 votes, normal order)

Johnson 4 – prohibit the President from providing any statutory sanctions relief pursuant to an agreement unless Congress adopts a joint resolution of approval, and to provide that the advice and consent of the Senate is required for approval of the agreement as a treaty. (67 votes)

Johnson 5 – prohibit the President from providing any statutory sanctions relief pursuant to an agreement unless Congress adopts a joint resolution of approval, and to provide that congressional approval is required for the agreement to go into effect. i.e. same as Johnson #4 but requires Congress to approve under normal order (60 votes)

Johnson 6 – Sense of Congress that the agreement is a treaty

Johnson 7 - prohibit the President from taking any action involving statutory release of sanctions relief pursuant to an Iran nuclear agreement unless Congress adopts a joint resolution approving the agreement. Additionally states that any agreement shall have no force or effect until 2/3<sup>rd</sup> of the Congress present and voting adopt a resolution of approval (67 senate or 290 house votes)

Johnson 8 - prohibit the President from providing any sanctions relief pursuant to an agreement unless Congress adopts a resolution of approval, and to provide that congressional approval is required for the agreement to go into effect

Isakson 1 – provides for compensation for American hostages held in Iran (I believe this is his version of the bill not the one passed by SFRC with State's requested changes)

Isakson 2 – sense of Congress that issues not addressed by the nuclear agreement (including compensation for the Iran hostages) are critical to the security of the US and should be addressed as a condition of sanctions relief for Iran

Flake 1 –modification to Sense of Congress (on p.22 lines 4-7) to say that in order to implement a final agreement, it is important that Congress has the opportunity to consider any agreement and take action to modify the congressionally imposed sanctions.

## **DEMOCRATIC AMENDMENTS**

Cardin 1 – reduces congressional review period from 60 calendar days to 10 session days

Cardin 2 – Permits the limited use of waivers to the extent necessary for Iran to commence compliance with an agreement

Cardin 3 – Strikes terrorism certification

Cardin 4 – Sense of Congress that (A) sanctions regime was responsible for bringing Iran to the negotiating table (B) these negotiations are critical to national security of US and our closest allies (C) an effective agreement with Iran would prevent Iran's activities from furthering nuclear related military or nuclear explosive device, with effective inspection and verification

and adequate time to respond if Iran materially breaches the agreement (D) an affirmative vote by Congress on the agreement is not a prerequisite for the agreement to take effect or commence (E) Even though the agreement is not subject to congressional approval, the sanctions regime was imposed by Congress and only Congress can modify or eliminate that regime and therefore it is important that Congress have the opportunity to consider and take action on any agreement affecting the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress

Cardin 5 – adds reporting requirement on Iran’s human rights violations

Cardin 6 – modifies reporting requirement on centrifuge R&D (report on any R&D that may substantially enhance the enrichment capacity of Iran if deployed *in violation of the agreement*)

Cardin 7 – provides Iran 30 days to cure any material breach

Murphy 1 – President may waive sanctions during the congressional review period if failure to do so would be a violation of the comprehensive joint plan of action

Murphy 2 – Strikes terrorism certification and clarifies that Congress retains the ability to increase sanctions on Iranian support for terrorist activities

Shaheen 1 – President may waive sanctions during the congressional review period if it is appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program and vital to the national security interests of the US

Shaheen 2 – Additional reporting and certification requirements related to whether Iran has failed to fulfill the terms of the joint plan of action and whether Iran has attempted to circumvent inspections

Coons 1 – reduce 60 days review period to 30 days

Coons 2 – strikes terrorism certification and adds a sense of Congress on Iranian support for terrorism

#### Boxer Amendments (1-18)

- 1) A complete substitute amendment to strike the Corker bill and replace it with a sense of Congress that it is premature to consider legislation related to a nuclear agreement with Iran until negotiations are concluded.
- 2) A complete substitute amendment to strike the Corker bill and replace it with S. 669, the *Iran Congressional Oversight Act*.
- 3) An amendment that strikes everything in the Corker bill up to the expedited procedure to reinstate sanctions and inserts the reporting/certification requirements in S. 669.

- 4) An amendment that strikes the language that prevents the President from waiving sanctions during the 60-day congressional review period.
- 5) An amendment that strikes the language that prevents the President from waiving sanctions during the 60-day congressional review period, and replaces it with language that says the President may not waive sanctions unless he certifies that waiving sanctions is *“appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran to implement the agreement”*, and vital to U.S. national security interests.
- 6) An amendment that adds a finding that, *“that former Mossad director Efraim Halevy recently wrote, ‘US President Barack Obama was right in labeling the document a ‘historic’ one... For decades, Iran rejected the international community’s demand to hold talks of any kind with respect to its nuclear program.’”*
- 7) An amendment that adds a finding that, *“former Mossad director Efraim Halevy recently wrote, ‘The interim agreement reached in Lausanne proves that Tehran capitulated, by agreeing to conduct negotiations about its plans and the nuclear infrastructure it has built up for years, primarily in secret.’”*
- 8) An amendment that strikes the language that sets up an up-or-down vote on the agreement, and replaces it with a sense of Congress that, *“Congress reserves the option to take action related to any agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran.”*
- 9) An amendment that strikes all of the reporting and certification requirements in the Corker bill and replaces them with the reporting/certification requirements in S. 669.
- 10) An amendment that strikes the references to Iran’s support of terrorism from the reporting and certification requirements, and inserts a new rule of construction stating that nothing in the bill shall be construed as *“preventing the President or Congress from continuing to impose or imposing new sanctions on Iran for its support for acts of international terrorism and human rights violations.”*
- 11) An amendment that adds a new sense of Congress that, *“a diplomatic resolution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is in the U.S. national interest, and in the interest of our allies including Israel.”*
- 12) An amendment that adds a new sense of Congress that, *“both Democratic and Republican administrations have relied on non-binding arrangements that do not require congressional approval to address sensitive national security matters, such as the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Helsinki Final Act.”*
- 13) An amendment that adds a new sense of Congress that, *“Congress has a vital role in monitoring the implementation of a comprehensive agreement with Iran relating to Iran’s*

*nuclear program, including the authority to permanently repeal statutory sanctions against Iran.”*

- 14) An amendment that adds a new sense of Congress that, *“the United States has an interest in ensuring that international support for and implementation of existing nuclear-related sanctions against Iran remains strong and, in the event that Iran violates its commitments under an existing nuclear agreement, that there is strong international support for the re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions, without which current or future sanctions will be far less effective.”*
- 15) An amendment that adds a finding that, *“the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by the Islamic Republic of Iran would pose a grave and serious threat to international peace and security, including the national security of the United States and its allies, and the best way to protect lives and avoid war is to resolve this issue diplomatically through an agreement.”*
- 16) An amendment that adds a finding that, *“United States and Israeli officials have stated that a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would not put a permanent end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.”*
- 17) An amendment that adds a finding that, *“according to a joint statement by 30 leading nuclear nonproliferation specialists, including Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Robert Gallucci, and Robert Einhorn, ‘The framework agreement announced by the P5+1 and Iran is—from a nuclear nonproliferation and security standpoint—a vitally important step forward. When implemented, it will put in place an effective, verifiable, enforceable, long-term plan to guard against the possibility of a new nuclear-armed state in the Middle East.’”*
- 18) An amendment that adds a finding that, *“a joint statement by more than 50 former foreign policy and military leaders, including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former Senator Richard Lugar, former Senator Nancy Kassebaum, and former Senator Carl Levin, stated, ‘In view of this hopeful progress, we call on the U.S. Congress to take no action that would impede further progress or undermine the American negotiators’ efforts to complete the final comprehensive agreement on time. The Congress should examine the announced framework, asking itself whether the potential for a comprehensive, verifiable accord is preferable to the current standoff with Iran or other alternatives as a means to ensure that Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon.’”*