Relations between Russia and the United States, as well as between Russia and US-oriented European countries, further deteriorated following the G-20 summit in Brisbane due to the crisis in Ukraine. This poses the question for analysts as to how this situation might affect Moscow’s Middle East policy and the existing forms of cooperation with the West on regional issues, namely: the Middle East quartet of international mediators; the negotiations of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) with Iran; the stabilization of the situation in Yemen; and the fight against terrorism.

Naturally, this kind of cooperation will be preserved, with Russia even bearing some of the political costs. For example, at the 2014 Conference on Non-Proliferation held in Moscow, one of the Iranian participants criticized Russia for its position in the P5+1 talks with Iran — clearly hinting at Russia’s solidarity with the West, rather than with Iran — to which the Russian participant emphasized that in this Moscow was guided exclusively by its national interest.

At the same time, the director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies, Anton Khlopkov, deplored the tendency to politicize the problem: “It is very unfortunate that this is now noticeable in the relations between Russia and the United States. I have always thought that concerning non-proliferation our interests — of both Moscow and Washington — coincide. Recently, however, on the initiative of our American partners, cooperation on a number of projects has either been frozen or suspended.” The position of the former UK representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Peter Jenkins, drew the attention of experts. He expressed regret that “the Obama administration makes unrealistic promises to Congress,” when it ensures that “it won’t give Tehran the opportunity to create its own nuclear bomb.”

The general atmosphere of mistrust between Russia and the West, especially the United States, also has an impact on Middle Eastern issues. Thus, in Conflicts Forum’s Weekly Comment for Nov. 14-21, it was noted that Russia sees radical Wahhabism and the Islamic State (IS) “as simply another [Saudi-Western] tool that equally can be ‘switched on’ to undermine Russia’s security.” And for Russia and its allies, the next question is: “Does the United States truly want to ‘degrade and destroy’ [IS]?” In this regard, some Western analysts recall accounts that appeared in the Western media after Prince Bandar bin Sultan’s visit to Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2013. On that occasion, the prince allegedly suggested that the Russian president “abandon Syria,” and “Saudi Arabia would protect the Sochi Olympics from Islamic terrorists.”