The story of Ehud Olmert, who was convicted March 31 on two charges of bribery by the Tel Aviv District Court, thus becoming the first convicted Israeli prime minister, was a personal, national, political and diplomatic tragedy.

He had not been poised to become the premier. Although a seasoned politician, Olmert was nevertheless a highly unpopular figure in Israel. Had he vied for the premiership on his own, he never would have stood a chance.

It was a political conjuncture, the kind of which can only happen in Israel’s unpredictable politics, which had him replace the late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who collapsed after suffering from a massive stroke in January 2006 on the eve of the general elections. Stepping into Sharon’s shoes deep into the election campaign of Kadima, a newly formed party that had been established on the ruins of the Likud Party, he somehow managed to garner 29 seats (out of the 40-plus seats that the polls had predicted for Sharon) and set up his new government.

Olmert’s government launched two regional military campaigns: the Second Lebanon War in July 2006 and Operation Cast Lead in Gaza at the end of 2008. Controversial from an operational standpoint, these two miniwars changed the rules of the game, consequently reshaping Israel’s deterrence on its southern border but more so on its northern one. Speaking of the northern border, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah would later admit that had he been able to anticipate the intense Israeli reaction to the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers — Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev — he would have avoided the entire adventure altogether. In tandem, Olmert conducted advanced peace negotiations on two fronts: vis-à-vis Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who back in the day was still deemed the omnipotent ruler in his country, and vis-à-vis Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.