ALEPPO, Syria — As the Geneva II conference came to a close without an agreement on a much-vaunted transitional government, the drums of war began to beat louder. There is now talk among the backers of the Syrian opposition of arming vetted rebel factions with sophisticated weapons, including shoulder-launched anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. The Russians have also suggested that the United States and France are planning limited military strikes in the south to reignite the stalemated Daraa front. The aim of all this is seemingly to restore the military balance on the ground after steady gains by regime forces. In such a complex and unpredictable conflict, however, such a strategy could easily backfire.
The overall goal of military pressure on the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad is to force it to make concessions and to improve the opposition’s hand in future negotiations, though not to allow the rebels an outright military victory. Such a victory by either side is next to impossible short of a campaign on the scale of that in Libya. Thus, yet again, the specter is raised of the timeless but paradoxical “bombing for peace” scenario, or so it would appear. This delicate balancing act of just enough force to alter the regime’s calculus, but not so much as to topple the state and create a void filled by radicals and extremists, is prone to a myriad of dangers. The United States and its European and Gulf allies’ track record in the Syrian conflict has so far been less than impressive, and there is no reason to suggest that their confused meddling will improve matters this time around.