Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan can be lauded for addressing the Kurdish problem in ways his predecessors were unwilling or unable to do. In Turkey, he has recognized the Kurds and their language rights, negotiated a cease-fire and “peace process” with Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan and even publicly referred to Kurdistan in a recent ceremony with Kurdish leaders in Diyarbakir. Erdogan also has successfully negotiated with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, assuring Ankara’s security, commercial and energy interests in ways that were unthinkable just five years ago.

Despite these efforts, Erdogan’s strategies have not necessarily moderated Kurdish transnationalism or fully assured Turkish interests across borders. To be sure, the Ankara-KRG alliance has assuaged an important segment of Iraqi Kurdish society and Kurds tied to KRG President Massoud Barzani. Barzani has become Turkey’s interlocutor in addressing Kurdish issues in Syria and Turkey, and more recently part of Erdogan’s re-election campaign in southeast Turkey. This alliance is also furthering Barzani’s aim to become leader of all the Kurds and has reinforced the KRG’s dependence on Turkey and need to coordinate its nationalist agenda with Ankara.

Still, as Erdogan expands his Kurdish file to include the Kurdish problems in Turkey and Syria, he has raised the expectations of what Ankara should provide to other Kurdish groups. Taking on three Kurdish issues simultaneously via Barzani may have captured one significant component of Kurdish society, but it has limited Ankara’s ability to influence groups that challenge Barzani's power — groups that have increased over time. In fact, elevating Barzani in the absence of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and a weakened Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has enhanced power struggles inside Iraqi Kurdistan and heightened the polarization between two emergent Kurdish nationalist power centers: followers of Barzani and supporters of Ocalan.

In some ways, employing Barzani to promote Turkish interests and mediate Kurdish nationalism across borders has backfired. For instance, inviting Barzani to the historical Kurdish city of Diyarbakir alongside renowned Kurdish singers Siwan Perwer and Ibrahim Tatlises in November 2013 certainly evoked Kurdish nationalist sentiment and support. It was a deeply symbolic moment, bringing together distinguished Kurdish leaders for the first time in a historical Kurdish city. Yet, beyond the initial hysteria and symbolism, the meeting has raised criticism by many Kurds of its purpose (an election campaign for Erdogan) and outcomes, and deepened the divide between the Barzani and Ocalan camps.