Lebanon’s slide into the Syrian quagmire has become fact and reality. Hezbollah’s intervention in the war there, and its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s announcement that its participation there would continue, and in fact even intensify, has made it clear — on a political and security level — that Lebanon is now part of the Syrian crisis and not merely affected by its repercussions. This characterization is most likely enhanced by actions from the other side, whereby Sunni Salafist factions seem to have retaliated for Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria by carrying out car bomb attacks against the party in Lebanon. The last of these was the Ruwais explosion that targeted a predominantly Shiite neighborhood in Beirut’s southern suburb, one of Hezbollah’s most important strongholds in the country.
The prevailing warnings of the past few weeks about Lebanon sliding toward a gradual sectarian Sunni-Shiite war have become more consequential. The last two weeks witnessed an intensification of reciprocal retaliatory kidnappings in the northern Bekaa region between adjacent Shiite and Sunni neighborhoods, as Salafist groups planted explosive devices targeting Hezbollah convoys along the Beirut-Masnaa road leading to Syria.
