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Saving Egypt's Third Democratic Transition

As Egyptians proceed with their third revolutionary transition, they might finally get it right if based on a broad national consensus and inclusivity.

Anti-Mursi protesters wave with their flags happily to a military helicopter passes over where protesters chant slogans in a square where anti-Mursi protesters gather for the third day in Alexandria, July 2, 2013. President Mohamed Mursi clung to office on Tuesday after rebuffing an army ultimatum to force a resolution to Egypt's political crisis, and the ruling Muslim Brotherhood sought to mass its supporters to defend him. REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih (EGYPT - Tags: POLITICS CIVIL UNREST) - RTX11A5Q
Anti-Mohammed Morsi protesters wave with their flags to a military helicopter passing overhead where protesters have gathered in a square in Alexandria, July 2, 2013. — REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih

As many engage in extended analysis of the July 24 speech by Egypt’s army chief, Gen. Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, and whether its main signal was that of strong intent on cracking down on growing violence around the country, of moving a step away from reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood and toward an even more substantial political role for the military or being predominantly an attempt to rally and recharge the pro-June 30 mood amid continued Brotherhood mobilization and national instability, perhaps it is time to take a fresh look at Egypt’s current transition.

Egypt’s first transition, following the 1952 revolution against the monarchy, did not go too well. Instead of creating a republican democracy, the military coup ushered in an era of political repression, single-party rule, state propaganda, and a powerful police state among other things. Nonetheless, most Egyptians tend to look fondly upon it because of the anti-poverty policies, soaring Arab nationalism, and bold foreign policy pushed by the charismatic coup leader and subsequent president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The second transition, which began in February 2011, suffered from a visionless process in which the powers and prerogatives of every political actor remained disputed throughout, eventually creating a defective new order that a large number of Egyptians, with good reason, refused to accept. Ultimately, it fell apart. The third transition must get it right.

To do so, one key question must be answered at the start: How should June 30, as a popular uprising (for a moment setting aside the military factor), eventually be entered in the history books? Should it be as a movement against the Muslim Brotherhood specifically, for its increasingly authoritarian tendencies and its astonishing mismanagement of the state? Perhaps as a reaction against political Islam as a whole? Alternatively, was it primarily a continuation of the 2011 revolution and the democratic and social ideals it represented?

The current answer being promulgated is essentially a combination of all the above. The distilled and relatively palatable version of it goes something like this: June 30 was an uprising to correct the ruined, post-January 25 transition by standing up to a creeping authoritarianism, as well as an expression of the substantial disillusionment with the Brotherhood-led experiment in blending religion and politics. If this is to be accepted as the truth, meaning that the goal is to establish a democratic and progressive Egypt, then everything in the transition must flow from that accordingly.

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