International politics and diplomacy can sometimes appear to be misleading, even paradoxical. Such was the case last week with the relationship between Israel and the European Union (EU). Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu found himself in a bizarre, even embarrassing, situation. At the beginning of the week, on July 16, he attacked the EU for its decision to impose sanctions on the settlements in Judea and Samaria and on Israeli communities in the Golan Heights. Within a few days, on July 22, Netanyahu was praising the EU for its decision to include Hezbollah’s military wing on its list of terrorist organizations.

After the EU announcement on the settlements, Netanyahu said, on July 16, “I would expect those who concern themselves with peace and stability in the region to only debate such an issue after resolving problems which are slightly more urgent, such as the Syrian civil war or Iran's race to obtain nuclear weapons.” Six days later, the prime minister played a different tune: “Israel has for years made huge efforts to explain to the EU countries that Hezbollah is an Iranian terrorist proxy operating throughout the world. … I hope that the decision will lead to tangible steps against the organization.”

Regarding the European boycott, Netanyahu got off relatively easy because the announcement was made almost simultaneously with the Israeli-Palestinian decision to return to the negotiating table. It is possible that the EU decision was an added incentive that convinced Netanyahu to comply with the tremendous efforts invested by US Secretary of State John Kerry to end three years of stalemate between the sides. Officially, Israel can now justifiably argue that there is no point in imposing economic sanctions on the settlements in the nine months allotted to the sides to reach an agreement that will determine their fates.

Meanwhile, an internal contradiction exists in the Israeli approach to the steps adopted by the EU. Does it make sense to criticize the EU decision imposing an economic boycott on the settlements while simultaneously supporting sanctions imposed by the same entity on Hezbollah? Is it possible to attack European leaders and flatter them at the same time? Can Israel argue that the EU ignores greater catastrophes and more severe crises in Syria and Iran and then, after six days, congratulate it for its actions against an organization that operates in Lebanon and assists Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Syria? Thus, in less than one week, Israel’s main argument against the EU lost its sting.