A few hours after the storming of the headquarters of the Iraqi Ministry of Justice on March 17, the justice minister disclosed information about a plot to break into the Green Zone. Iraqi Justice Minister Hasan al-Shammari had spoken apprehensively about his intention to further implement execution sentences and said that he himself will oversee this task. A few hours later, al-Qaeda responded by launching 20 car bombs that did not leave one single neighborhood unscathed in the capital.

In a statement, al-Qaeda said that its attacks were in response to Shammari's threats and that the organization will continue its operations, which are designed to defend the "Sunnis in Iraq."

Thus, away from the unprofessional rhetoric of the Iraqi justice minister in his news conference on March 18, and disregarding the criticism of the apprehensive and inadequate discourse of Iraqi political leaders in dealing with such attacks — especially as they attempt to take advantage of such events to serve their political and electoral interests — one must note that the Iraqi security forces, backed by the Iraqi political elite, continue to deal with the security issues as consequences and not as reasons. Politicians in Iraq refuse to even consider that violence exhibited by these organizations could be a reaction or a consequence [to the existing status-quo].

What is certain is that the security problem in Iraq lies substantially in the fact that this issue is not addressed with regard to its social, historical, political and security dimensions. It is also very clear that the Iraqi security strategy is unsound, which adversely affects the bad political situation that has prevailed in Iraq for years.