Most Sunni politicians who publicly lead or address the current protests in Anbar, Mosul and other Sunni areas were part of electoral coalitions that identified themselves as nationalist, non-sectarian and even cross-sectarian.

In the last general election in 2010, most of them were running in the Iraqiya coalition, which was defined as cross-sectarian and formally led by the secular Shiite Iyad Alawi. What triggered the current demonstrations was the case of Rafi al-Issawi, the former finance minister whose house was assaulted by security forces, with several of his bodyguards arrested on charges of terrorism. Issawi is among the few Sunni politicians who seemed to have gained a broader base by identifying themselves with the protesters. Others are, for example, Ahmed abu Risha, the former leader of the "Awakening group" which allied with the US army in the battle against al-Qaeda in Anbar. He was a leading figure in the "Unity of Iraq" coalition led by the former Shiite minister of interior, Jawad Boulani.

Recently, Abu Risha identified himself with the protesters, calling for an end to sectarian discrimination by the Iraqi government and unfair treatment of Arab Sunnis. Also, Nujaifi, the speaker of parliament and another leader of al-Iraqiya, told al-Jazeera in an interview that Iraqi Sunnis are a majority in Iraq, denying the Shiite claims of the same. Abu Risha, in another TV interview, maintained that Baghdad is a Sunni city. The protesters' calls last February to "march on Baghdad" symbolized the emerging Sunni narrative in which Baghdad is presented as the "promised land" that must be redeemed by its original owners.

The statistical game about who are the majority and the clash of narratives over space is part of this new atmosphere of increasing sectarianism. It is true that Iraq before 2003 was predominantly ruled by Sunni rulers, but they rarely chose to be identified as Sunni. There was no explicit or coherent Sunni ideology commanding their political loyalty or action. The current Sunnification of Sunni politics comes as a rupture from a long history in which sectarian identification was not appealing among Iraqi Sunnis. In fact, Shiite political groups were more inclined to sectarian identification as a result of long years of exclusion and marginalization, particularly since the coup d’état that took place in February 1963. Shiite parties thought that presenting sectarian categorization to Iraqi politics would consolidate their support base, since their constituency represents the popular majority. This may be exactly the reason Sunnis disliked sectarian categorizations.