Much like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the story of the security fence between Israel and the West Bank consists of two different narratives, each claiming to be the ultimate, truthful account. As head of the military body in charge of planning its route, and a member of negotiation teams with the Palestinians over the past two decades, I have come to see the situation in a more nuanced light.

The Palestinian terror onslaught that began in September 2000, and raged on until 2006, has been obliterated from our collective memory all too readily. We have unwittingly adopted its Palestinian name, the Second Intifada, thus actually accepting the view that confirms Palestinian valor in steadfast resistance, and legitimate opposition, to an Israeli occupation.

Palestinian ingenuity in maneuvering public opinion has even succeeded in stirring sympathy for the cause among large parts of the Israeli public. Indeed, the Palestinian public opinion campaign has caused many Israelis to forget that it was the Palestinians who instigated the bloody confrontation when they tried to compensate for political gains denied them at the Camp David Summit in 2000 through terror. It was not Hamas that launched the murderous attacks on Israeli citizens, but rather the Tanzim, the militant wing of the Fatah, which was led by Marwan Barghouti, under the direct command of the "Rais" — President of the Palestinian National Authority, Yasser Arafat.

Former Israeli governments, under the leadership of both Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon, were against the construction of a security fence for internal political considerations. The decision to build the first part of the security fence was made in June 2002, following a horribly bloody March, when 139 Israeli citizens were murdered in terror attacks.