Turkey’s new paradox
The aftermath of the July 15 attempted coup has produced the most serious crisis and erosion the Turkish state has ever seen.
The July 15 attempted coup has created a plethora of problems in Turkey. Purging the Gulenists, who entrenched themselves secretly in the state over four decades, taking hold of critical posts and eventually attempting a military coup, has been the No. 1 agenda item for the country’s democracy and politics in the past three months.
The erosion of state institutions, especially the military, the existence of a secret organization capable of attempting a coup, elements that remain potentially uncovered and the risks they pose to the rule of law made the purge an absolute necessity.
No doubt, the question of how the cleansing should be conducted and how it is actually being conducted is another problem, and it is as important and decisive as the purge itself. And a serious paradox has emerged here. The methods employed in the purge have come to pose a serious threat to that very democracy and rule of law whose protection makes the purge and the reconstruction of the state an imperative.
Five days after the putsch, the Turkish government declared a state of emergency, a situation where the government suspends certain basic rights and freedoms. Ever since, Turkey has been governed through legislative decrees that bypass parliament. The paradox stems both from the legal flaws in how the Gulenists are being pursued, which has increasingly resembled a witch hunt, and the way the emergency-rule regime is being used, going beyond the stated purpose of pursuing and cleansing the putschists.
