The first week of December marks two full months since the outbreak of violence in Israel on Oct. 1. During this time, dozens of attacks have been recorded, occasionally two or three a day. To date, 21 Israelis have been killed in addition to one Eritrean and about 100 Palestinians.

Addressing military correspondents on Nov. 25, a senior Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officer said that the uprising might very well expand. According to him, on average there are about 15 flash points on weekdays and about 40 total during weekends. Additionally, the number of demonstrators can run as high as 200,000. Yet, the IDF refuses to call the events of the past two months an intifada, or uprising.

The use of the expressions “intifada” and “wave of terror” is not merely a matter of terminology or semantics. Defining the event is important because it is essential for ascertaining the most suitable and most effective tools for combating and curbing incidents. If one is talking about an intifada, then much greater and more elaborate resources would be needed than would be the case for the type of limited military response required to stop a “wave of assailants.”

“Wave of terror” — the term the Israeli defense establishment has been using since early October and which has since been revised to a “limited uprising” — is misleading. It makes people, including those in Israel’s political establishment, think that the “wave” will blow over, so no decisions of any real substance are needed to make it go away. Indeed, the operational measures taken to date to counter this so-called wave of terror have been reactionary and limited. They consist of demolishing the homes of attackers, combating incitement, setting up roadblocks and beefing up troops, mainly in East Jerusalem and Hebron, and a few other tactics.